The studies reported here are part of a series dealing with cognitive arousal and reverberation. Prior investigations highlighted the influence of brief posthypnotic manipulations of mental arousal, introduced during the reverberation phase following stimulus presentation of strings of consonants, upon the later salience of those stimuli. In the present experiments, S's task consisted 1st of reading aloud 6 words in scrambled order from 2 familiar 3-word phrases and then reporting whatever words "popped into mind" during a 12-sec. period. Posthypnotic experimental interventions consisted of (o) the auditory hallucination of numbers while reporting words, and (b) the alterations of cognitive arousal in S degrees ranging from very high to very low. Both variables produced significant effects upon the meaningful organization of words in 2 5s' reports.
The phenomenon of thought disorganization is observed in many settings, including dreams, psychosis, and sensory deprivation. The looseness of association characteristic of the primary process mode of thinking, neologistic productions of schizophrenia, and the reports of impaired thought continuity during isolation are all familiar. The range and operation of mechanisms underlying such disruptions are less clearly established.
One obvious mechanism is interference. For example, Lang and Buss (196S) in discussing schizophrenia emphasized interference from "internal" stimuli which consist of deviant thoughts and associations. Both Freud, interpreting the breakthrough of unconscious ideas as a failure of repression, and Bleuler (19SO) , postulating a "weakness of inhibition" to account for irrelevant thoughts in schizophrenia, were acknowledging the role of interference. In an empirical study of the effect of distraction on normal Ss, Cameron and Magaret (1949) found more "scattered speech" when 5s completed sentences while simultaneously concentrating on a story for later recall.
A second common source of disorganization is anxiety, which can operate either as a 1 This project was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant 08847-03 (G. S. Blum, principal investigator) .
2 Now at University of California, Santa Barbara. 8 The authors wish to express their appreciation to P. James Geiwitz for several editorial suggestions. distractor in itself or as a general mechanism for triggering inhibition of ongoing activity (Blum, 1961) . The increasingly disruptive effects of degrees of anxiety on a variety of tasks with normal 5s have already been well documented Blum, Geiwitz, & Stewart, 1967) . Anxiety is assigned a central function in Mednick's (1958) view of schizophrenia. Irrelevant thoughts are said to be "rewarded by anxiety reduction by removing disturbing ideation from consciousness [p. 316] ."
Another mechanism conceivably related to the breakdown of thought sequences is low arousal. Here the evidence is less clear. By inference it can be argued that sleep is a lower state of arousal than waking, and therefore the looseness of association noted in dreams may be attributable to that fact. Yet the EEC activity in REM sleep, where dreaming typically occurs, is greater than in other stages of sleep. Rossi, Furhman, and Solomon (1967) referred to conflicting evidence on the role of arousal level in sensory deprivation and presented evidence supporting their view that thought disorganization takes place during low levels. The clue to some of these discrepant findings, as noted earlier (Blum, Geiwitz, & Stewart, 1967) , may very well be a necessary distinction between cognitive and organismic aspects of arousal. Dawes (1965) , manipulating sensorimotor (predominantly organismic) underarousal posthypnotically in our laboratory, obtained rather 610 inconclusive evidence favoring greater breakdown of category organization under lowered arousal.
Recent work on the concepts of cognitive arousal and reverberation brought us to the point where a direct experimental attack upon the problem of thought disorganization seemed feasible. The distinction between cognitive and organismic arousal, to which we have referred, had produced a posthypnotic programming technique geared specifically to the former. Two series of studies (Blum, Geiwitz, & Hauenstein, 1967; Blum, Hauenstein, & Graef, 1968) had established the existence of a period of autonomous reverberation subsequent to input registration and had implicated level of mental arousal and interference as crucial factors in determining the course of such reverberation. Moreover, an adaptation of our salience technique which had been employed in those studies seemed especially promising. In this method 5 is instructed merely to attend to a stimulus presentation without a learning set and later to report those items which spontaneously "pop into mind" for whatever reason. In the cognitive reverberation experiments the stimuli were strings of six consonants to which 5 listened passively. Following various kinds of filler activity, such as counting beats of a metronome or looking at travel slides, he was asked to report any six consonants in time with the metronome. Salience scores, relating this verbal output to the stimulus set of letters, provided the data by which different experimental interventions, like posthypnotic arousal changes during the filler period, were evaluated. Seven principles of cognitive reverberation were thus derived in the first series of studies and then replicated and extended in the second.
METHOD Subjects
The Ss were two male undergraduates, aged 19 and 20. Each had participated on a paid basis for over a year, 4 hr. a week, in a number of experiments. They were thoroughly practiced in hypnotic skills, including amnesia, hallucination, and the ability to experience five degrees of mental arousal in response to certain posthypnotic cues. In the waking state, while amnesic for the prior hypnotic programming, they became exceptionally alert upon presentation of the cue "+AA" and almost stuporous In response to "-AA." A medium state of arousal was cued by "0," halfway between 0 and +AA was labeled "+A," and halfway between 0 and -AA was labeled "-A."
A variety of studies with other 5s had affirmed the validity of these cognitive arousal manipulations, which consistently yielded monotonic relationships to number of errors in a visual tracking task (Ehrlkh, 1964) , degrees of boredom (Geiwitz, 1966) , and response latency in a discrimination task employing a scale of tachistoscopically flashed Xs (Blum, Geiwitz, & Stewart, 1967) . The same ordered effect was noted when the arousal cues were in force during registration of both focal and incidental stimuli as well as during the reverberation period in the salience task (Blum, Geiwitz, & Hauenstein, 1967) . For the two Ss in the present investigation the cues had already been employed successfully hi the follow-up studies of cognitive reverberation (Blum et al., 1968) .
Stimuli
Our aim was to present stimuli under conditions which would initiate thought organization. Then, while the still loosely connected thoughts were in the process of reverberating, we wanted to introduce experimental changes in level of interference and cognitive arousal. The effects of these manipulations were to be observed in the degree of organization in S's subsequent verbal output.
For stimuli we chose scrambled presentation of words from familiar three-word phrases. On a given trial 5 was asked to read aloud each of three words exposed on a card (at the rate of one every 2 sec. in time with a metronome beating once a second). After a 2-sec. pause another card with three more words was given him to read. Each card contained, in order, the second word from one phrase, the third word from the other, and the first from the original phrase. The six words, if unscrambled across the two cards, comprised two familiar phrases. 
Pretesting
Pretesting with a different set of phrases determined conditions favorable to the immediate amount of organization desired during exposure to the words. According to prior hypnotic instruction, 5s in a state of lowered arousal read the words "one at a time, not thinking of the others [but not amnesic] while reading each one." Back at the normal arousal level immediately afterward, and when asked to say any words at all that popped into mind over a 12-sec. period, they had typically responded with sequences of words which were neither fully organized nor random. Evidence that this loose degree of organization was initiated during stimulus presentation came from two sources: subjective reports that a phrase occasionally came into consciousness while reading the second card, and the virtually complete elimination of any organization from the verbal output by inserting amnesia between words. That is, when Ss were programmed to "forget" each word temporarily before reading the next, they subsequently reported words discretely in a jumbled order even though the amnesia was explicitly removed before the report period.
In both the interference and cognitive arousal experiments, therefore, 5 read the words one at a time while under lowered arousal, and reverted to the normal level immediately after the second card was removed and before he began to execute the salience task of saying any words that occurred to him until told to stop 12 sec. later. This time duration was chosen to make it possible for 5 to report six words at approximately the same rate as he had read words earlier.
Interference Procedure
The experimental manipulation for the interference procedure consisted of S's posthypnotic auditory hallucination of numbers while reporting words. There were three conditions: (a) After removal of the second card of words, E said three digits (e.g., 2-7-4) in time with the metronome (one a second) in a loud voice, which by prior hypnotic instruction meant that S was immediately to begin "hearing" those numbers loudly at successive beats over and over until told to stop; (b) E said three digits in a soft voice, signifying soft background hallucination of the numbers; or (c) E said, "No numbers," which meant that there would be no hallucination on that trial. Following these number instructions E allowed 3 sec. to pass, during which 5 completed one round of number hallucinations for the loud or soft trials or did nothing. Then E said, "Now," which was the waking instruction for 5 to begin saying words at the moment they popped into mind, without regard to the metronome rate. After 12 sec., the "Stop" signal terminated both the salience task and the number hallucinations and also served to institute posthypnotic amnesia for the whole trial before proceeding to the next one. Each 5 was given 30 randomized trials, 10 per experimental condition. Random combinations of three-digit numbers were employed, 
Cognitive Arousal Procedure
For the cognitive arousal procedure, E substituted one of the posthypnotic cues (+AA, +A, 0, -A, -AA) for the numbers instruction, and 5 performed the salience task under its influence. Fifty randomized trials, 10 per condition, were spread over two sessions.
Assessment of Thought Organization
The degree of organization in S's salience output was assessed by the following system: If the three words from a phrase were spoken consecutively and in order (ROOM-FOR-RENT) , a score of 4 was assigned. If the three were consecutive but out of order (RENT-ROOM-FOR) , a score of 3 was given. Two adjacent words in a meaningful order (ROOM-RENT) or with only a minor element ("a," "and," "the," "or") missing were scored 2; otherwise two adjacent words (RENT-FOR) were scored 1. The final score on a trial consisted of the sum of the scores for each of the two phrases, making a possible range of 0-8. Three scorers examined the responses and pooled their judgments in the very few ambiguous cases between 2 and 1. Table 1 demonstrates the role of interference in breaking down thought organization. For both 5s the mean organization scores are ordered according to presence and degree of interference provided by the posthypnotic number-hallucination activity. When the numbers were "heard" loudly at each beat, the loosely organized thoughts disintegrated to the extent that neither S ever obtained a summed score over 2 (out of a possible 8) on a single trial. The interference reduced the total production of words in the 12 sec. (an average close to three words for both 5s in the loud condition), and those words which did appear had little or no connection between them. For the soft condition, summed scores on individual trials ranged from 0 to S for 5EE, from 0 to 4 for S^s-The average number of words spoken by each was four. In the nonhallucinatory condition, where no interference was programmed, individual trial scores ranged from 2 to 8 (SEE) and from 2 to 6 (5]rs). The average production for 5 B E was five words; for 5rs it was again four.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Interference Experiment
The fact that there is a relationship between organization score and number of words reported can be interpreted as causal in either direction. Of course, a higher score automati-cally entails more words, but it is also conceivable that the simple production of a greater number of words could have resulted, on a probabilistic basis, in higher organization scores. We consider it more likely that the degree of organization had a greater influence upon word production than vice versa. Whenever a phrase appeared intact it was spoken quickly as a unit. Thus a score of 4 on a phrase cannot reasonably be attributed to the presence of more words and hence a greater chance of juxtaposition in the appropriate order. In addition, the data for SFS yielded higher organization scores for no versus soft numbers when the average word production was the same in both. Figure 1 portrays the striking results of the cognitive arousal manipulations. For both Ss there is a progressive decrease in organization as arousal drops from very high to very lowa finding which requires no further statistical elaboration to rule out chance as an explanation. It is important to note that raising the level above normal produces greater organization. The modal trial scores for both Ss in the +AA condition is the maximum of 8; that is, the two phrases were typically reported as complete units. Comparing the curves of the two Ss, it appears that the arousal cues had more impact upon SFS, whose slope is steeper. Also, his normal degree of organization under the 0 condition is somewhat less than SEE'S, as it was in the no numbers condition of the interference experiment (see Table 1 ). Looking at the potency of interference versus lowered arousal effects, we see that for SEE strong interference (loud condition) resulted in much more disintegration than did -AA; for SFS the trend is in the opposite direction.
Cognitive Arousal Experiment
Our interpretation of the cognitive arousal effect assumes, from the pretesting evidence cited earlier, that the words were already reverberating in loosely organized form at the time the arousal cue was introduced. The prior connections in memory probably were reactivated tenuously, by the end of the stimulus presentation, at a level very vulnerable to disruption. Optimal preservation of this organization occurred under +AA, when general amplification in the system was highest and reverberation therefore strongest, so that the otherwise imminent decay process was retarded long enough for the words to reach consciousness in organized fashion during the report interval. Progressive drops in arousal weakened the decay-retarding reverberation more and more, with a resultant decrease in organization at each step. An alternative formulation is provided by the consolidation hypothesis, which would hold that a period of time was needed for the phrase organization to consolidate after the second stimulus card was removed. The arousal cues could have affected this process differentially. Of the two, we prefer the decay-retarding hypothesis as more parsimonious (see Blum, Geiwitz, & Hauenstein, 1967) . The present findings are consistent with those of the hexagram experiments mentioned in the introduction. Salience scores of both one and two strings of consonants were observed to change systematically with the level of cognitive arousal after stimulus presentation. A concept of autonomous cognitive reverberation, subject to alteration by changes in general amplification or competing activity, emerged clearly from those data. Various controls for intentionality and unconscious response bias on the part of S were included to rule out artifacts. A more limited repetition of one of these controls was carried out after completion of the present experiment. The S was given a few trials in which the arousal cues were inserted at the start of a trial and terminated just before the stimulus cards were shown instead of afterward. Under these conditions where theoretically there should be no cue effects, but the opportunity for subjectively biased reporting remains, no differences were found among cues.
In conclusion, the results have demonstrated, in quantitative fashion, the effects of interference and cognitive arousal upon the processing of organized thought-at least to the extent that organization is represented by the formation of a familiar phrase from reactivation of its elements. The fact that interference produces disorganization is of course not surprising; however, the sensitivity of this process to the hallucinated intensity change (loud versus soft) in the competing activity is noteworthy. The breakdown of continuity in schizophrenic thought, when hallucinations and delusional ideas are rampant, is an obvious analogy.
The marked influence of cognitive arousal is more intriguing. The posthypnotic manipulation of degrees of free-floating alertness and concentration, brought to bear on whatever cognitive networks happen to be in process at the time, has once again exerted systematic effects. It seems as though general "attention" level (in quotes because of the absence of an object upon which to focus) can be raised or lowered reliably in steps. Introspective reports by 5s typically confirm the freefloating aspect along with the easily identifiable changes in degree. This varying amount of amplication available overall in the system thus determines the fate of specific networks, such as the familiar phrases in our experiment, which are being processed. The mechanism by which hypnotic training can accomplish precise regulation of arousal is of interest, though not directly relevant to the present study. Our view is that an individual is potentionally capable of voluntary control over his amplification level. With practice under optimal conditions this capability can be realized impressively. Our reasons why hypnosis provides an optimal setting have been spelled out in detail elsewhere (Blum, 1961 .
Spontaneous changes in mental arousal (again the distinction from organismic arousal must be kept in mind) could be expected to show similar influence upon the processing of thoughts. The fluctuations characteristic of waking life are probably more prominent in sleep and especially so in abnormal conditions like sensory deprivation. Under extremely heightened arousal, thoughts may gel with such clarity that the imaginary seems real; under lowered arousal, they may disintegrate into an incoherent jumble.
